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It would be idle to pretend that publication alone . . . is a 
reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact 




Service of process is a critical aspect of litigation.2
 
       † Jessica Klander grew up in Saint Cloud, Minnesota.  She earned her 
Bachelor of Arts degree in English Literature in 2004 from Macalester College in 
St. Paul, Minnesota.  Before attending law school she worked as a sales account 
executive, an office manager, and most recently as a licensed independent 
insurance agent in Becker, Minnesota.  Jessica is expected to receive her juris 
doctor from William Mitchell College of Law in May 2010. 
  In an 
 1. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
 2. See Rachel Cantor, Internet Service of Process: A Constitutionally Adequate 
Alternative?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 945 (1999) (“A fundamental component of 
due process is the opportunity to be heard; that opportunity is worthless unless the 
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adversarial system, the rules safeguarding service of process ensure 
that the defendant is able to properly defend and be fairly heard.3  
Yet, perhaps because it forms the bedrock of procedural due 
process, it is among the slowest rules to adapt to modern-day 
litigation.4  The standards for substituted service, specifically service 
by publication, are controlled by case law over a century old.5  
Despite the amenability, speed, and efficiency of modern-day 
technology, service by publication has not been modified to reflect 
these advances.6  Recently, in Shamrock Development v. Smith, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed, and perhaps further 
tightened, the historic restrictions on service by publication.7  
Critics and commentators have begun to challenge the efficacy of 
restrictions on service by publication, asserting that electronic 
publication may not only be constitutionally permissible, but a 
superior means of effecting service.8  As one commentator 
suggested, “[electronic publication] offers a potentially greater 
likelihood to effect notice than traditional methods of 
publication.”9
 
defendant is aware that there is a matter pending against her.”); Aaron R. 
Chacker, E-ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v. Rio International Interlink, 48 VILL. L. 
REV. 597, 599 (2003) (“American jurisprudence regards notice as a fundamental 
procedural component of commencing litigation.”) (citation omitted). 
   
 3. See Cantor, supra note 2, at 945 (noting that notice protects defendants’ 
constitutionally protected right of due process); Chacker, supra note 2, at 602 
(noting that due process requires defendants to be given notice of hearing against 
them and the opportunity to raise objections).  
 4. See Adriana L. Shultz, Comment, Superpoked and Served: Service of Process Via 
Social Networking Sites, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1497, 1499, 1528 n.10 (2009) (“The 
requirement that plaintiffs give notice to defendants of claims against them has 
existed in some form for over 4,000 years . . . .  One of the earliest known legal 
codes, the Code of Eshnunna, required plaintiffs to ‘shout’ or ‘speak’ their cause 
of action.”) (citing REVUAN YARON, THE LAWS OF ESHNUNNA 118–19 (Magnes Press 
1988)). 
 5. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878) (substituted service by 
publication is insufficient for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction but does 
support an exercise of in rem jurisdiction), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (holding that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction 
must comport with the International Shoe minimum contacts test). 
 6. See Lindy Burris Arwood, Personal Jurisdiction: Are the Federal Rules Keeping 
Up With (Internet) Traffic?, 39 VAL. U. REV. 967, 970 (2005) (asserting that doctrinal 
emphasis on territorial boundaries and notice is antiquated in the context of 
modern technology and electronic communication). 
 7. 754 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 2008).  See infra notes 70–77 and accompanying 
text. 
 8. See infra Part IV, notes and accompanying text.  
 9. Christopher B. Woods, Commercial Law: Determining Repugnancy in an 
Electronic Age: Excluded Transactions Under Electronic Writing and Signature Legislation, 
2
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This note first examines the history of service of process and 
the evolution of service by publication.10  It then details the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Shamrock,11 followed by an 
analysis of that decision.12  The note then explores the 
constitutional sufficiency of electronic service13 and how it may 
actually be constitutionally required, given the wealth of evidence 
suggesting that electronic communication is an increasingly 
prevalent medium for social interaction.14  Furthermore, case 
precedent and recent amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure show a widespread trend towards further incorporation 
of electronic processes,15 indicating that a similar shift is likely for 
service of process.16  Finally, the note concludes that because the 
Shamrock court’s decision further restricts service by publication 
notwithstanding modern technology and constitutional notions of 
service of process, the ruling may be unconstitutional and in need 
of reevaluation.17
II. HISTORY  
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Unites States Constitution 
promises that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”18  The cornerstone of due 
process is to guard against governmental abuse of power and to 
ensure the opportunity to be heard, which is enforced through 
jurisdictional limitations.19  Historically, a state’s jurisdictional 
power to confer a judgment on an individual was based on 
territorial boundaries and the individual sovereignty of the states.20  
Thus, in order to establish personal jurisdiction, the defendant was 
to be personally served within the boundaries of the state.21
 
52 OKLA. L. REV. 411, 445 (1999). 
  If this 
was impossible, there were only limited instances where substituted 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV.A. 
 13. See infra Part IV.B. 
 14. See infra Part IV.C.  
 15. See infra Part IV.D. 
 16. See infra Part IV.D. 
 17. See infra Parts IV.E, V. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 19. Id.; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950).  
 20. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock II), 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 
2008) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877)).  
 21. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723. 
3
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service was an appropriate means for providing adequate notice.22
Of the alternatives available for providing notice, service by 
publication has traditionally been viewed most harshly by the 
courts, because it is deemed to provide essentially no notice at all.
  
23  
The Court’s skepticism is evident in the 1878 case that laid the 
common law foundation for personal jurisdiction, Pennoyer v. Neff.24  
In Pennoyer, the Court greatly restricted the use of service by 
publication by requiring that the defendant be personally served 
within the boundaries of the state in order for jurisdiction to 
exist.25  An exception allowing service by publication was made for 
actions concerning property within the state that had been seized 
from a nonresident owner.26  Conversely, the court explained that 
where the defendant was a nonresident and the cause of action did 
not involve property within the state, service by publication was 
always invalid.27
This ruling was adopted into Minnesota law and reflected in a 
1917 ruling involving an alimony judgment.
  
28  In Roberts v. Roberts, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the common law standard, 
holding that service by publication is void where the defendant is a 
resident of the state and can be found.29  But where the defendant 
resides in the state and intentionally evades service of process, 
service by publication is valid.30
 
 22. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917) (holding that delivery of 
summons to a defendant’s last and usual place of abode is sufficient due process 
in some circumstances); see also Shultz, supra note 
  As businesses expanded nationally 
and the complexity of multi-party litigation became more 
prominent, the physical presence standard set by Pennoyer became 
4, at 1503–05 (delineating the 
expansion of the law to include alternative forms of substitute service including: 
service by publication, mail, telefax, facsimile, and e-mail).  
 23. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (“Chance alone brings to the attention of 
even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a 
newspaper”); Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are you Being Served?: E-mail and (Due) Service of 
Process, 51 S.C. L. REV. 227, 242 (2000) (“[S]ervice of process through posting or 
publication often provides less certainty that notice will reach the defendant than 
other methods of notification.”); Woods, supra note 9, at 444 (“[P]ublication 
cannot reasonably be argued to provide notice.”); id. at 444–45 (“Any defendant 
outside of that area is virtually assured of not being notified.”).  
 24. 95 U.S. at 724.  
 25. Id. at 727.  
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Roberts v. Roberts, 135 Minn. 397, 398, 161 N.W. 148, 148 (Minn. 1917).    
 29. Id. at 400, 161 N.W. at 149. 
 30. Id.  
4
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increasingly scrutinized.31  International Shoe Co. v. State of 
Washington answered these concerns by expanding the Pennoyer 
physical presence rule to require an analysis of the defendant’s 
minimum contacts within the state, rather than domiciliary status 
alone.32  Interestingly, although the standards for personal 
jurisdiction were ultimately expanded by the Court, the 
requirements for affecting substituted service were left relatively 
unchanged.33  Therefore, a defendant might meet the standards for 
minimum contacts within a state, but jurisdiction does not exist 
until the defendant has first been adequately served.34
The standard for publication was challenged soon after the 
International Shoe decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and 
Trust.
 
35  The Court recognized that although personal service is 
greatly preferred, when it is impracticable, substituted service may 
be necessary to ensure finality of the dispute.36  Although the Court 
determined service by publication to be adequate in Mullane, it 
cautioned against the overuse of service by publication stating that 
“[service by publication] do[es] not sweep away the rule that within 
the limits of practicability, notice must be such as is reasonably 
calculated to reach interested parties.”37
“Reasonably calculated” became the formula for the 
constitutional standard of constructive notice.
   
38  This formula was 
reflected in a 1967 Minnesota alimony suit, Gill v. Gill.39
 
 31. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945); see also Shultz, 
supra note 
  The court 
admitted that although publication is not a reliable means of 
notification, it is an appropriate substitute where it is “not 
reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate 
4, at 1499 (suggesting that growth and commercial expansion made the 
Pennoyer standard unworkable).  See generally Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve Got Mail: The 
Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337 
(2003) (describing the expansion of service of process). 
 32. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.  
 33. Although the court did not directly determine the sufficiency of substitute 
forms of service of process, they did acknowledge the expansion of the law to 
include notice via registered mail when reasonably calculated to best notify the 
defendant.  Id. at 320. 
 34. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock II), 754 N.W.2d 377, 384 n.3 
(Minn. 2008). 
 35. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S 306 (1950). 
 36. Id. at 313.   
 37. Id. at 318.  
 38. Id. at 314.  
 39. 277 Minn. 166, 171, 152 N.W.2d 309, 313 (1967).  
5
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warning.”40  The court held that notice by publication is limited to 
and dictated by extreme necessity.41
Minnesota law, as evidenced in the Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure, continues to reflect the historical standard of service by 
publication by first requiring adequate service of process before 
personal jurisdiction can be established.
 
42  The five circumstances 
where service by publication can be used are: (1) where the 
defendant domicile resident left the state with the intent to defraud 
creditors, avoid service, or remain concealed; (2) where the 
plaintiff has acquired a lien on property by attachment and the 
defendant is a resident and cannot be found, has left the state, or 
the defendant is a nonresident; (3) in marriage dissolution cases; 
(4) where the cause of action is regarding property within the state; 
or (5) in cases of foreclosure.43
Despite the advent of the International Shoe minimum contacts 
standard and the constitutional formula for due process articulated 
in Mullane, the requisite standard for service by publication 
remains relatively unchanged, holding steadfastly to the historical 
underpinnings of personal jurisdiction and domiciliary residency.
  
44  
The stability of this doctrine reflects the intent to limit the 
expansion of service by publication and the judicial suspicion that 
it threatens the integrity of the due process clause of the 
Constitution.45  This is further exemplified by a recent Minnesota 
decision, where the courts were again asked to analyze the impact 
of modernity on the validity of common law standards of notice 
and due process.46
 
 40. Id. (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317). 
  Again in Shamrock Development, Inc. v. Smith, the 
courts remained rigidly true to the common law restrictions of 
 41. Id.  In Gill, the resident defendant intentionally hid himself to evade 
service and avoid judgment against him.  Id.  This fact was undisputed in the case 
and justified the application of service by publication in order to bring finality to 
the dispute.  The decision to implement service by publication was ultimately 
contingent upon the plaintiff’s success in meeting the conditions outlined in the 
statute.  Id.  So, although the Mullane formula of notice by reasonable calculation 
was adopted, meeting the conditions outlined by the statute remained precursory.  
Id.  
 42. See Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock II), 754 N.W.2d 377, 384 n.3 
(Minn. 2008). 
 43. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(a).   
 44. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 384 n.3; see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 45. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 384 n.3. 
 46. Id. at 378. 
6
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service by publication defined over 150 years ago.47
III. THE SHAMROCK DEVELOPMENT DECISION 
   
Shamrock Development, Inc. (“Shamrock”) became involved 
in the dispute after Farm Credit Leasing Services Corporation 
(“Farm Credit”) assigned them the right to judgment against 
Dakota Turkey Farms limited partnership (“partnership”).48  The 
judgment came from a civil case in April 1996 in which Farm Credit 
prevailed against the partnership and certain individual partners, 
including Randall Smith (“Smith”).49
In 2006, Shamrock decided to renew the judgment by 
commencing a new civil action against the debtors on the eve of 
the judgment’s expiration period.
  
50  On March 19, Shamrock 
attempted service of process to the partnership’s registered 
Medina, Minnesota address, but discovered it was now owned by a 
private resident unassociated with the partnership.51  Shamrock 
then effected service of process on the partnership by serving the 
Secretary of State.52
Subsequently, Shamrock attempted to locate Smith, an 
individual debtor, using an online database.
  
53  Despite addresses in 
the Farm Credit affidavit that specified Smith’s residence as in 
Washington, D.C. and his business in Virginia, Shamrock limited 
the online search to the Medina address.54
 
 47. Id. at 385. 
  The results indicated 
 48. Id. at 379–80.  
 49. Id. at 379. 
 50. Id. at 380.  By law, all actions in Minnesota to enforce a judgment must be 
started within ten years of the entry of that judgment.  MINN. STAT. § 541.04 
(2006).  Shamrock commenced the action against the past debtors just weeks 
before the statute of limitations expiration date.  Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 380. 
 51. Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 380.  The original action against the 
partnership included an affidavit filed by Farm Credit in which it indicated 
Smith’s residential address in Washington, D.C., and his business address in 
Arlington, Virginia.  Id. at 379.  Another similar affidavit identified an address in 
Medina, Minnesota, as both the residential and business address of one of the 
other partners, as well as the registered address for the partnership on file with the 
Secretary of State.  Id. at 380.  When the action by Shamrock was commenced the 
partnership was no longer located at the Medina address but was owned by a 
private resident unassociated with the suits.  Id. at 379–80.    
 52. Id. at 380.  By Minnesota law, when attempted service against an entity 
such as a partnership fails because the agent or partner cannot be located at the 
address on file with the secretary of state, the claimant can serve the secretary of 
state in lieu of the agent or partner.  MINN. STAT. § 5.25 (2008).  
 53. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 380. 
 54. Id. 
7
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that Smith was “associated” with the Medina address in “some 
manner,” but the results were largely unsuccessful.55  On March 22, 
Shamrock’s attorney filed a copy of the summons, complaint, and 
an affidavit initiating service by publication.56
Smith moved to dismiss the claim through a limited 
appearance, claiming that service by publication was insufficient 
because he was not a domicile resident of Minnesota and the form 
of publication was not reasonably calculated to notify him, 
therefore violating his due process rights.
  
57  The district court 
denied Smith’s motion to dismiss, holding that Minnesota law does 
not require the plaintiff to prove the factual elements necessary to 
exercise service by publication, but need only show a reasonable 
good faith belief that the elements do exist.58  The court of appeals 
affirmed this decision.59
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the decision, 
interpreting the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure as limiting 
access to service by publication beyond a good faith belief in the 
information contained in the affidavit.
 
60  The court held that a 
good faith belief was not sufficient to warrant service by publication 
but that the “existence of one of the enumerated circumstances is a 
necessary condition for service of process by publication to confer 
jurisdiction.”61
 
 55. Id.  After the online database failed, Shamrock searched bankruptcy 
filings and hired a private investigator.  Id.  These efforts, albeit brief, were also 
unsuccessful.  Id.   
  The holding exemplified the court’s narrow 
interpretation of the rule and their intent to limit the application 
 56. Id.  The affidavit stated: “Defendant Randall N. Smith is a resident 
individual domiciliary who has departed from the State of Minnesota with intent 
to defraud creditors, or to avoid service, or remains concealed within with the like 
intent.”  Id.  The summons was then published in Finance and Commerce, a 
Minneapolis business and legal newspaper, on March 24, 31, and April 7, 2006.  Id. 
at 381.  
 57. Id. at 381.  
 58. Id.  The district court interpreted Minnesota law as requiring only that 
the affidavit forming the basis for service by publication be made honestly and in 
good faith by the plaintiff based on information available.  Id.  
 59. Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock I), 737 N.W.2d 372, 381 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2007).  
 60. Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 383.  The court commented that the language 
of the service by publication rule was “plain,” indicating that the rule “does not 
confer jurisdiction unless one of five specific circumstances actually exists.”  Id.  
The court ultimately reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district 
court to determine if Smith was in fact a Minnesota resident and if he had 
intended to defraud investors or avoid service.  Id. at 385. 
 61. Id. at 383. 
8
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of service by publication.  Shamrock stands to affirm the two 
requirements needed within the plaintiff’s affidavit to exercise 
service by publication: “(1) an affirmation of the essential 
jurisdictional facts of one of the enumerated cases . . . and (2) an 
affirmation of the affiant’s belief that the defendant is not a 
resident of the state or cannot be found in the state.”62
The Shamrock ruling regarding service by publication is 
consistent with the historical foundation of the Pennoyer standard 
and state sovereignty, allowing the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over residents of the state only when they are physically present.
  
63  
The decision is also consistent with previous holdings by the court 
regarding standards for service by publication.64  The consistency of 
this ruling with historical standards is fitting because the facts of 
this case are largely unremarkable and do not diverge from 
previous service by publication cases.65  According to the court, 
Shamrock overlooked the affidavit containing Smith’s contact 
information, and because of this oversight, service by publication 
was inadequate.66  However, the court did not only apply the 
traditional standard, but articulated a more restrictive rule.67  
Despite the Mullane formula of reasonable calculation, the court’s 
decision suggests that the application of the service of process rule 
should be both hierarchical and conditional.68
 
 62. Id. 
  One could infer, 
 63. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720–24 (1878). 
 64. See Gill v. Gill, 277 Minn. 166, 152 N.W.2d 309 (1967); Roberts v. Roberts, 
135 Minn. 397, 161 N.W. 148 (Minn. 1917); see also supra note 41 and 
accompanying text.  
 65.  The facts are largely unremarkable because, unlike numerous cases 
discussed in this note, the plaintiffs are not attempting service through technology 
but only through paper publication. 
 66. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  Interestingly, the court needed 
only to cite the prerequisite for service by publication in order to dismiss the case, 
rather than clarify the rule.  According to Corpus Juris Secundum, “resorting to 
service by publication” requires the plaintiff to have first exercised due diligence 
in acquiring the information necessary to find the defendant.  72 C.J.S. Process § 85 
(2005).  Because the Minnesota Supreme Court believed the plaintiff had failed to 
exercise due diligence, the case could have been dismissed.  Yet, the court instead 
took the opportunity to clarify the elements necessary to assert service by 
publication, and thereby further restricted the rule.   
 67. See discussion supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 68. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S 306, 314 (1950); 
Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock II), 754 N.W.2d 377, 383–84 n.3 (Minn. 
2008).  But cf. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014–15 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (construing FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) and finding subparts of the procedural 
service rule were not intended to be treated hierarchically).  
9
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regardless of what type of service might actually be most reasonably 
calculated to reach the defendant, that the plaintiff must first 
attempt personal service, then, alternatively, leave a copy at the 
defendant’s usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and 
discretion, and only when those fail may service by substitute means 
be adequate.  However, service by publication may only be 
exercised if the plaintiff believes and can actually prove that one of 
the five circumstances outlined by the rule exists.69
IV. ANALYSIS  
  
A. Shamrock Decision 
In Shamrock, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a 
plaintiff’s good faith belief and due diligence were not sufficient to 
warrant service by publication.70  The court clarified the language 
of the rule and in so doing, effectively restricted the use of service 
by publication by not only reiterating the Pennoyer standard but by 
also requiring the plaintiff to prove one of the conditions named.71  
Shamrock became an opportunity for the court to reevaluate the 
elements of an archaic rule and perhaps broaden them to reflect 
modern communication.72  Yet instead of broadening the 
application of service by publication, the court articulated a stricter 
interpretation of the rule.73  Despite the court’s insistence that the 
ruling does not reform but only clarifies the existing standard for 
personal jurisdiction and service by publication,74 many 
commentators would disagree with this assessment.75
 
 69. See supra note 
  Where the 
43 and accompanying text.  
 70. Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 383.  
 71. Id.  
 72. See supra note 62.  
 73. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 383; see also supra Part III.  
 74. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 383 (“This interpretation is consistent with 
the historical underpinnings of the rule.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 4, at 1511 (“[T]he Constitution does not 
require any particular means of service of process, but only that the method 
selected be reasonably calculated to afford notice and an opportunity to 
respond.”) (referring to the decision in Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 
F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002)); Tamayo, supra note 23, at 257 (“As methods of 
communication improve and individual mobility increases, mechanisms for 
serving process should evolve to allow for more convenient methods of serving 
process on a defendant while complying with constitutional due process and 
statutory requirements.”); Woods, supra note 9, at 444 (“Electronic publication, on 
the other hand, could actually offer a greater likelihood of providing notice than 
the traditional method of service by publication.”).  
10
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Mullane formula offers a flexible, ad-hoc approach to deciding the 
method most adequate for conferring notice, Shamrock effectively 
bars service by publication as a valid means for providing notice by 
articulating a bright-line, hierarchical standard.76  This is especially 
problematic where modern technology has influenced 
communication patterns so as to warrant electronic service as a 
compelling means for providing notice.77
B. Shamrock Decision – Unconstitutional? 
 
While the rules of civil procedure change over time, they are 
always bound by the principles encapsulated in constitutional 
notions of due process.78  The constitutional threshold for due 
process is that notice must be made by a method that is most 
“reasonably calculated” to reach the defendant.79  Personal service 
is the classic method for conferring notice and is the preferred 
method by both procedural and constitutional standards.80  
However, where personal service is impractical, substitute service is 
allowed to bring finality to the action.81  The constitutional 
standard is deliberately broad so as to weigh the defendant’s right 
to due process against the State’s interest in bringing finality to the 
action.82  The broad constitutional interpretation also encourages 
state courts to shape the rules to the facts of the case, expanding 
upon the rules and often testing constitutional boundaries.83
 
 76. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14, 318 
(1950); see also supra note 60.  
  
 77. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 78. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also supra notes 18, 19 and 
accompanying text.  
 79. Mullane, 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
 80. See id. at 313 (“Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is 
the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding.”). 
 81. Id.  (“[T]he vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its 
fiduciaries to a final settlement can be served only if interests or claims of 
individuals who are outside of the State can somehow be determined.”); see also 72 
C.J.S. Process § 70 (2009) (“Since ‘substituted service’ by its very designation 
indicates a form of service which may be used as a substitute for personal service, it 
is obviously . . . different and distinct from the latter. . . .  It is within the power of 
the legislature to provide for substituted service in cases of necessity or if personal 
service is for any reason impracticable.”). 
 82. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (“Against this interest of the State we must 
balance the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 83. See 72 C.J.S. Process § 71 (2009) (illustrating the validity of statutes 
authorizing substituted service as well as being liberally construed so long as they 
are guided by the principles of due process); see also ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4.1 (allowing 
11
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Although courts are justified in expanding upon the alternatives 
available for substitute service, the constitutional sufficiency of the 
method must remain valid.84
Yet, while the constitutional standard may limit divergence, it 
can also be a catalyst for change when rules become outdated and 
antiquated.
   
85  The constitutional standard of due process requires a 
plaintiff to use a method reasonably calculated to reach the 
defendant, which implies that courts must provide the methods 
appropriate for doing so.  When the methods available are no 
longer reasonably calculated to reach the defendant, the courts 
must, in turn, make the changes necessary to comply with the 
standard.86  Because of the influence of modern technology on 
communication patterns, electronic service may be a significantly 
better means for reaching a defendant, making the exclusion of 
electronic service suspect.87  Due process requires that the method 
employed reflect an actual desire to inform the defendant, and 
when the defendant is best informed through electronic service, 
the exclusion of this method is in conflict with this underlying 
principle.88  Because the constitutional sufficiency for affording 
notice is factually specific, the plaintiff is required to conform to 
the actual behavior of the defendant.89  But when the methods for 
providing notice do not conform to actual behavior, due process 
becomes a loophole, rather than a safeguard, for defendants to 
evade service.90
Currently, the Minnesota rule for substitute service is limited 
  
 
alternative service, other than by publication, when the other forms available 
prove impracticable and with court allowance); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.20; 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.021 (allowing for summons to be left at place of business if 
personal service is unavailable); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.310 (allowing for alternative or 
substitute services as directed by the court when personal service proves 
impracticable). 
 84. See 72 C.J.S. Process § 71 (2009). 
 85. See supra notes 83, 84 and accompanying text.   
 86. 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1764 (2009). 
 87. Because of the increasing prevalence of electronic communication, the 
constitutional standard of due process will eventually force courts to expand 
substitute methods to include electronic service of process.  This is because the 
factual basis for what is most “reasonably calculated to reach the defendant” has 
changed, and, in turn, the processes used to afford notice must change.  See 
discussion infra Parts IV.A, B.  
 88. 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1764 (2009).  
 89. See id.  
 90. See Chacker, supra note 2, at 597. 
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to providing notice through face-to-face interaction.91  The rule 
states that service of the summons can be conferred upon an 
individual by “delivering a copy to the individual personally or by 
leaving a copy at the individual’s usual place of abode with some 
person of suitable age and discretion.”92  The rule’s construction 
and the recent Shamrock decision require the plaintiff to physically 
find the defendant or else prove she is intentionally evading service 
in order to justify the use of service by publication.93  Other than 
notice by physical delivery or service by publication in rare 
occasions, the only other option is through constructive notice by 
certified mail.94  The rule remains greatly restricted, suggesting a 
preference for service through face-to-face interactions and a 
strong skepticism towards substitute service.95 This preference is 
acceptable as long as physical notice continues to be the most 
reasonably calculated to reach the defendant.96  The fundamental 
assumption of the rule is that other than personal service, the most 
reliable means for affording notice is by leaving a copy of the 
summons at the defendant’s home with a person of suitable age 
and discretion.97
 
 91. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03; see supra notes 
  Meaning, people are most likely to receive 
71–74 and infra notes 94–103 and 
accompanying text.  Although Minnesota does offer the alternative of service by 
certified mail, this is considered constructive notice and only available where the 
defendant waives her right to service.  Additionally, although service by 
publication is also an option, it can only be exercised once all other alternatives 
are exhausted as a last resort for achieving finality of the suit.  See MINN. R. CIV. P. 
4.03; see also Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith (Shamrock II), 754 N.W.2d 377, 384 
(Minn. 2008); see also discussion supra notes 41–45 and corresponding text. 
 92. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a). 
 93. See Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 383; see also MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.05.  As 
discussed earlier, it has become increasingly apparent that courts do not consider 
service by publication a valid means for conveying notice, other than as a last 
resort.  See discussion supra note 22 and accompanying text; discussion infra Part 
IV.A.  
 94. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04, 4.05.  Although the rules allow for service by mail, 
in accepting such notice, the defendant is considered to have waived his right to 
service of process.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d).  The courts strongly encourage service 
by mail as it is an efficient and cost effective means for delivering notice.  See 
Shultz, supra note 4, at 1503.  However, at its foundation, notice by mail still 
depends on physical interaction, with the postman and roommates as 
intermediaries.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.05.  As discussed earlier, it has become 
increasingly apparent that courts do not consider service by publication a valid 
means for conveying notice, other than as a last resort.  See discussion supra note 
22 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 95. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04; see also Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 382. 
 96. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 97. MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.05; see also Shamrock II, 754 N.W.2d at 384. 
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information through face-to-face interactions, such as from a 
roommate, than by any other means.98  If, however, notice through 
an internet posting, for example, were a significantly more suitable 
means for affording notice than through a roommate, its exclusion 
could be deemed unconstitutional.  In an age where face-to-face 
communication is becoming eclipsed by electronic and online 
communication, it is logical that electronic service would be a 
significantly more suitable means for reaching the defendant.99  
The rigid construction of the current rule seeks to protect the 
defendant’s right to due process, but as modern society changes, it 
does so at the cost of fairness and judicial efficiency.100
C. Changing Patterns of Communication: The Facebook Phenomenon 
 
The internet has quickly become a natural background to 
everyday life.  In 2002, more than 600 million people worldwide 
had access to the internet and the numbers continue to rise.101
It has been vilified as a powerful new tool for the devil, 
awash in pornography, causing users to be addicted for 
hours each day “surfing”—hours during which they are 
away from their family and friends, resulting in depression 
  Yet 
with great popularity comes even greater scrutiny and as one 
commentator described it: 
 
 98. Due to modern technology and the rise of electronic communication, the 
assertion that people have more face-to-face interactions than any other kind is 
likely a false assertion.  If someone were to have dozens more interactions with 
Facebook friends, for instance, than their roommate or spouse, would the denial 
of affecting notice through Facebook be unconstitutional?  See discussion infra Part 
IV.C.  
 99. See discussion infra Part IV.C.  
 100. The Fourteenth Amendment and the rule for service of process are 
meant to protect the defendant’s right to be heard.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 
1 (due process and defendant’s rights); 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1444 (2009) 
(noting that “[p]rocedural due process means that persons whose rights may be 
affected are entitled to be heard, and in order that they may enjoy that right, they 
must first be notified.”).  Yet the plaintiff ought to be protected from the undue 
burden of using ineffective methods for conferring notice where the defendant 
can be adequately put on notice electronically.  Electronic service is both efficient 
and inexpensive, and likely constitutionally superior.  See Cantor, supra note 2, at 
966 (“Internet service is cheaper than either traditional mail or personal service . . 
. [and] is nearly costless to the plaintiff . . . .  Moreover, because an email user can 
reply to an email without costs, replying to the plaintiff’s service is ‘prepaid;’ 
therefore, a plaintiff can use email to send a waiver request to the defendant.”). 
 101. John A. Bargh & Katelyn Y. A. McKenna, The Internet and Social Life, 55 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 573, 573–74 (2004) (discussing the profound effects of the 
internet on private lives). 
14
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and loneliness for the individual user, and further 
weakening neighborhood and community ties.102
Whether or not the internet causes such extreme isolation is 
certainly debatable, but not within the contemplation of this 
note.
 
103  Rather, this note asserts that the effects of the internet 
have so distinctly changed the face of modern society that the 
customary means for communication has shifted from face-to-face 
interactions to electronically-mediated interactions.104
Earlier technologies have effected change, but none in recent 
history has been as influential and extensive as the internet.
  
105  The 
effects of the internet on business and the dissemination of 
information are significant, but the more interesting and perhaps 
more surprising impact is the effect it has had on interpersonal 
communication and relationships.106  Nowhere has the effect been 
more profound than on the most recent generation.107  Today, 
teenagers have never known life without computers or cell 
phones.108  Virgin Mobile USA reports that more than nine in ten 
teens with cell phones have text messaging capabilities; two-thirds 
use text messaging daily.109  The dependence on electronic 
communication, albeit ingrained upon the lives of teenagers, is 
widespread and becoming more common among older 
generations.110
 
 102. Id. at 574.  
  The pervasive impact of electronic communication 
 103. See id. (suggesting that the traditional perception that the internet causes 
depression and loneliness is a largely exaggerated and unfounded fear). 
 104. See id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.C.  
 105. See Bargh, supra note 101, at 574. 
 106. Id.   
 107. Kaveri Subrahmanyam & Patricia Greenfield, Online Communication and 
Adolescent Relationships, 18 FUTURE OF CHILD. 119, 125–37 (2008) (discussing 
concerns “about the nature and quality of online and offline relationships and 
how online communication affects adolescents’ relationships and well-being”). 
 108. The cell phone was invented by Martin Cooper in 1973.  See About.com, 
Inventors, Martin Cooper – History of Cell Phone, http://inventors.about.com/ 
cs/inventorsalphabet/a/martin_cooper.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). 
 109. See Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, supra note 107, at 122.  The statistics 
show that more than half of Virgin’s customers aged fifteen to twenty send or 
receive at least eleven text messages a day, while nearly a fifth text twenty—one 
times a day or more.  Id.  From October through December 2006 Verizon Wireless 
hosted 17.7 billion text messages, more than double the total from the same 
period in 2005.  Id.  Recently a study found that teens use instant messaging in 
particular as a substitute for face-to-face talk with friends from their physical lives.  
Bonka S. Boneva, Teenage Communication in the Instant Messaging Era, in 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AT HOME, 612–72 (Robert E. Kraut et al. eds., 2006). 
 110. See Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, supra note 107, at 124 (outlining a 
recent study showing that over 73% of American college students now use the 
15
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on modern society has indisputably changed how people 
commonly interact and communicate.111  With the advent of social 
networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter, the use 
of computer-related mediums for fostering and maintaining 
relationships has increased exponentially.112  To date, over 300 
million people are members of the popular networking site 
Facebook, and 120 million of those members log on daily.113  The 
popularity of social networking websites has caused researchers to 
begin to study the relationship between patterns of communication 
and online interactions.114
 
Internet more than their university library for researching term papers); see also 
Facebook, July 31, 2009, facebook.com/facebook (citing that the fastest growing 
demographic on Facebook is 35 and older); Peter Corbett, 2009 Facebook 
Demographics and Statistics Report (July 6, 2009), http://www.istrategylabs.com/ 
2009-facebook-demographics-and-statistics-report-513-growth-in-55-year-old-users-
college-high-school-drop-20/ (“There has been a staggering increase in the 
number of 55+ users – with total growth of 513.7% in the last six month [sic] 
alone.”). 
  Unsurprisingly, many studies show that 
 111. “Cell phone users in the United States have increased from 34 million a 
decade ago to more than 203 million, which comes very close to fulfilling the 
Supreme Court’s one man–one cell phone mandate.”  Peter Leo, Cell Phone 
Statistics That May Surprise You, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 16, 2006, 
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06075/671034-294.stm.  As of June, 2009, there 
were over 227,636,000 internet users in the United States alone, up from 
120,000,000 in 2000. Internet World Stats North America, http://www 
.internetworldstats.com/america.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).  
 112. See e.g., Facebook Visits Increased 194 Percent in Past Year, http://www 
.hitwise.com/us/press-center/press-releases/social-networking-sept-09/, Oct. 9, 
2009 (ranking the market share of U.S Internet visits to the top five social 
networking sites). 
 113.  Facebook, Press Room–Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/ 
info.php?statistics (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).  Facebook users have a myriad of 
options for accessing information about their friends and the avid users total more 
than 6 billion minutes spent on Facebook each day.  Id.  Facebook users can 
upload photos and videos, update their statuses and browse web pages via mobile 
phone, link to journals and other news-related articles and blogs through the 
website, and send messages to friends, as well as have instant message 
conversations with friends currently online.  Facebook users are online constantly, 
checking the status updates of their friends, and sending and receiving messages 
between fellow Facebookers online, often from the convenience of their mobile 
phones.  See the Facebook website for more information on using Facebook 
features.  Facebook, Getting Started Guide, http://www.facebook.com/help/ 
new_user_guide.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). 
 114. See Richard P. Bagozzi et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Online Social 
Interactions, 9 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 77 (2007); Bargh & McKenna, supra note 101; 
Gustavo S. Mesch, Social Context and Communication Channels Choice Among 
Adolescents, 25 COMP. IN HUMAN BEHAV. 244 (2009); Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, 
supra note 107; Elisheva F. Gross, Adolescent Internet Use: What We Expect, What Teens 
Report, 25 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 633 (2004). 
16
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greater use of electronic communication and computer-mediated 
interactions correspondingly decreases face-to-face 
communication.115  In fact, one commentator noted that although 
much is yet to be learned about electronic communication and 
social relationships, one thing is certain: “teens now conduct a 
higher proportion of their communication through writing in an 
electronic medium rather than face-to-face or voice-to-voice.”116  
Another study found that teenagers spend a week or more online 
without ever logging off, as one surveyor in the study indicated, 
“I’m always signed on, I always have an awake message up and that 
way people can let me know if something major is happening in my 
life.  I even have an awake message on when I’m asleep or when 
I’m away at school.’”117
With the recent studies pointing to an exponential increase in 
the use of electronic communication, it could reasonably be argued 
that people currently, or soon will, have a more consistent online 




 115. See Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, supra note 
  With this in mind, the 
assumption that an average person is at home or checks their 
107, at 135 (An intense four-
year video study of thirty families with children showed the role of technology in 
modern family life.  When the working spouse came home the other spouse and 
the children were often so absorbed in electronic media they only greeted him 
about one-third of the time.  “Electronic multitasking has become pervasive, 
sometimes at the expense of face-to-face family interaction, among siblings as well 
as with parents.”); Bagozzi, supra note 114, at 105 (finding that users of “high-
interactivity” web communication, such as Facebook or instant messaging, show a 
decreased level of face-to-face interactions with family as compared to before 
engaging in online social interactions); Gross, supra note 114, at 646 (“Of 
particular note is the extent to which boys . . . resembled girls in their heavy use of 
the Internet for social communication . . . . Most participants reported using the 
Internet for both social and nonsocial purposes—often simultaneously.”). 
 116. Subrahmanyam & Greenfield, supra note 107, at 136. 
 117. Generation Speed: Today’s Teens, GOOD MORNING AM. (Sept. 30, 2005), 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/ AmericanFamily/Story?id=1172574) 
(“The survey included 180 Chicago junior and senior high school students and an 
online version completed by 641 teens in eleven states.  62% said they could not 
live comfortably without their cell phone, IM or e-mail for more than a few days, 
and 31% said life is moving too fast.”).   
 118. This is certainly already the case with many businesses, and the courts 
have already begun to deal with its effects. In Rio Properties, Inc., v. Rio International 
Interlink, a casino brought a trademark infringement action against a foreign 
internet business. Because the defendant had no physical address, the court 
allowed service by e-mail stating, “RII listed no easily discoverable street address 
. . . . RII had neither an office nor a door; it had only a computer terminal.”  284 
F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002). 
17
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mailbox more than they are online is highly unlikely.119  Notions of 
due process demand that the court provide the means necessary for 
the plaintiff to best afford notice reasonably calculated to reach the 
defendant; if this is through electronic service, the court ought to 
allow it.120  Therefore, when it is significantly more likely that a 
defendant would receive notice through a posting on her Facebook 
page, or through a friend on Facebook, than by leaving a copy with 
a roommate, it may be unconstitutional to disallow this form of 
notification.121
Electronic service may not only be constitutionally required, 
but may also prove to be a more reliable and effective means for 
reaching an evasive defendant.
   
122  A defendant may easily avoid 
service at a physical address by moving or claiming ignorance, but 
may find it more difficult to elude service where internet sites and 
computer hard drives track specific usage and make information 
difficult to delete.123  The importance of using electronic service 
would be especially relevant when dealing with companies that 
conduct business primarily online.124
 
 119. See id. 
  Online-only businesses are 
 120. In fact, there have been recent cases suggesting a trend towards the use of 
electronic service, especially where there is a foreign defendant.  See id. at 1017 
(holding that the facts of the case find service by email appropriate form of notice 
and, “[i]n proper circumstances, this broad constitutional principle [notice 
reasonably calculated to provide notice] unshackles the federal courts from 
anachronistic methods of service and permits them entry into the technological 
renaissance”); New Eng. Merch. v. Iran Power, 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (holding that where notice upon a foreign defendant is made 
impracticable, service by telex is acceptable: “Thus, as it stands now, 
telecommunication remains a sound method by which to insure that defendants 
are notified of the instant actions.”); In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 
713, 721 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (holding that service upon a foreign defendant 
via email was sufficient to comport with notions of due process: “Moreover, 
communication by facsimile transmission and electronic mail have now become 
commonplace in our increasingly global society.”); Shultz, supra note 4, at 1497–
98 (citing Nick Abrahams, Australian Court Serves Documents via Facebook, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, Dec. 12, 2008, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/
technology/biztech/lawyers-to-serve-notices-on-facebook/2008/12/16/122918957
9001.html). 
 121. See discussion infra Part IV.B.  
 122. See Cantor, supra note 2, at 965 (“Internet service has the potential to be 
more secure, and thus more reliable, than any form of service employed in the 
past.  Digital signatures . . . are harder to forge than traditional signatures . . . .  
[U]nlike traditional mail, where one mail box or mail room may serve a number 
of people, one internet account usually serves one person.”).  
 123. See Cantor, supra note 2. 
 124. See Rio Prop., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
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increasingly prevalent, and in Rio Properties Inc. v. Rio International 
Interlink, the court acknowledged service by email as the most 
appropriate means for notice because such companies have 
“neither an office nor a door; [they] only [have] a computer 
terminal.”125
The use of electronic service provides other judicial and public 
policy benefits as well.
 
126  The increased allowance of electronic 
document submissions has already helped to alleviate the crippling 
effect of filing and paperwork in courthouses.127  The use of 
electronic filing also significantly improves the overall efficiency of 
court dockets, and the allowance of electronic service would likely 
continue to foster goals of judicial expediency.128  Justice and 
integrity may be fundamental judicial goals, but the cost and time 
of litigation, as a practical matter, is a crucial aspect in every step of 
the judicial process.129  The Advisory Committee of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure has indicated that one of its primary goals 
is decreasing the costs of litigation, and that service of process is an 
area in desperate need of such reform.130  Furthermore, 
constitutional due process preserves the plaintiff’s right to provide 
notice, free of overly burdensome requirements, and by a means 
that is both feasible and cost efficient.131
 
 125. Id.  
  Because of the 
 126. See discussion infra Part IV.D.  
 127. John M. Murphy III, From Snail Mail to E-Mail: The Steady Evolution of Service 
of Process, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 93 (2004) (discussing the increased 
trend towards electronic submissions for discovery documents and motions).   
 128. See Cantor, supra note 2, at 944 (“The internet is not only commonly and 
widely used, but also fast and inexpensive as a means of effecting service.”).  See 
generally Murphy, supra note 127, at 92–96; Shultz, supra note 4, at 1524; Woods, 
supra note 9, at 444; Frank Conley, :-) Service with a Smiley: The Effect of E-Mail and 
Other Electronic Communications on Service of Process, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 407, 
414–15 (1997). 
 129. See supra note 128 and corresponding text.  
 130. Cantor, supra note 2, at 966 (noting the Advisory Committee’s desire to 
mitigate the cost of litigation through technology.); Conley, supra note 128, at 411 
(“Rule 4 places a strong emphasis on the need to save costs. The rule states that 
the defendant ‘has a duty to avoid unnecessary costs of serving the summons.’”). 
 131. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317–18 (1950) 
(“We recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would be attendant on 
frequent investigations into the status of great numbers of beneficiaries . . . and we 
have no doubt that such impracticable and extended searches are not required in 
the name of due process.”). See also Cantor, supra note 2, at 966 (suggesting service 
via the internet may be constitutionally required in some circumstances because 
“internet service is cheaper than either traditional mail or personal service; thus 
internet service promotes the Advisory Committee’s desire to limit the overall 
costs of service.”). 
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commonality of electronic communication and the fact that 
electronic service is virtually costless, the logical and 
constitutionally reasonable progression would be for such an 
allowance.132  As the amount of mail delivered decreases and the 
prevalence of email increases, the continued denial of electronic 
service indicates a preference for the defendant, and may become 
an easy loophole for the evasive defendant to avoid service of 
process.133
D. The Trend: Case Law and Rule Changes  
  Electronic communication has caused the foundation of 
Minnesota Rule 4.03 to become archaic, and the evidence of the 
numerous judicial and public policy benefits indicates the need for 
statutory reform.  In fact, the lack of electronic alternatives to 
service of process may very well be an unconstitutional oversight. 
However unchanged the standard for service by publication, or 
slow the progression towards electronic service may be, cases 
calling for the increased allowance of electronic service have 
inundated the courts.134
 
 132. Cantor writes,  
  New England Merchants National Bank v. 
Iran Power Generation and Transmission became one of the first cases 
The constitutionality of internet service of process will become 
increasingly clear as the number of Americans who rely on the internet as 
their principal means of communication increases.  If it is obvious that 
one’s chosen medium for communication is the internet, then it is also 
obvious that the form of notice most ‘reasonably calculated’ to reach the 
defendant is also the internet.   
Cantor, supra note 2, at 966. 
 133. See id. at 961 (arguing that internet service would be more difficult to 
avoid because “the defendant would be unable to make changes to the web site, 
he would be unable to ‘lose’ the service.”). See also Chacker, supra note 2, at 597 
(“But what systematically exists as a rightful protection for litigants has developed 
into a procedural loophole through which wily defendants can avoid litigation.  
More specifically, in certain instances, effectuating notice has become a game of 
‘hide and seek.’”); Murphy, supra note 127, at 107–08 (“Indeed ‘service of process 
is not a game of hide and seek’ but defendants can often be surprisingly evasive 
when it comes to avoiding courts . . . .  [A]s technology grows, courts should not 
be afraid to use this technology where defendants are hiding from service.”).  
 134. See Rio Prop. Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding service by email appropriate where defendant is evasive); Ryan v. 
Brunswick Corp., No. 02-CV-0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(holding service by email adequate even where evasiveness is not extreme); New 
Eng. Merchs. v. Iran Power, 495 F.Supp. 73, 81 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (allowing 
service by telex); In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs. Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 721 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2000) (holding service by email sufficient). 
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to allow electronic service of process through the use of telex.135  
The court recognized the lack of case precedent in such a decision, 
but justified the validity of incorporating modern technology into 
service of process, stating that “[courts] cannot be blind to changes 
and advances in technology. No longer do we live in a world where 
communications are conducted solely by mail carried by fast sailing 
clipper or steam ships.”136  In In re International Telemedia Associates, 
Inc., the United States Bankruptcy Court further expanded the use 
of electronic service by allowing the use of email to serve an evasive 
defendant.137  Similar to New England Merchants, the Telemedia 
Associates court defended its decision despite a lack of 
corresponding case precedent stating that, “any unspecified form 
of alternative service usually has its genesis in untried or formerly 
unapproved methodology . . . . It would be akin to hiding one’s 
head in the sand to ignore such realties and the positives of such 
advancements.”138  The court, in both Telemedia Associates and New 
England Merchants, recognized that it would not only be imprudent 
to ignore technological advances where it would increase a 
plaintiff’s ability to effect notice, but that it would simply be 
illogical.139  Although electronic service is still an exception to the 
rule, courts have become more inclined to allow electronic service 
where there is an evasive foreign defendant.140  Courts have justified 
this more liberal application of the rule, because where there is a 
foreign defendant and service is impracticable, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure allow for court directed service under special 
circumstances.141  In order for courts to allow electronic service on 
a domestic defendant, however, there would need to be a 
statutorily defined rule designating its allowance.142
 
 135. New Eng. Merchs., 495 F.Supp. at 81. 
  Although there 
are no states that specifically allow for electronic service on a 
 136. Id. 
 137. Int’l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. at 720–21. 
 138. Id. at 719. 
 139. New Eng. Merchs., 495 F.Supp. at 81; Int’l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. at 719.  
 140. Rio Props. Inc., v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding service by email appropriate where foreign defendant is evasive); Ryan v. 
Brunswick Corp., 2002 WL 1628933, No. 02-CV-0133E(F) at *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(holding service by email adequate even where evasiveness is not extreme); Int’l 
Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. at 722 (holding service by facsimile or email was 
sufficient to provide notice to evasive foreign defendant). 
 141. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3) (service allowed “by other means not prohibited by 
international agreement, as the court orders.”). 
 142. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
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domestic defendant, some permit alternative service as “directed by 
the court.”143
Despite the lack of electronic service in the United States, it 
cannot be long before such case law will begin to surface, because 
as noted by the court in Rio Properties, “[t]o be sure, the 
Constitution does not require any particular means of service of 
process, only that the method selected be reasonably calculated to 
provide notice and an opportunity to respond.”
  However, there has yet to be a case in the United 
States where this could be construed so as to include an internet 
posting via a Facebook page, for instance.   
144  As the internet 
fast becomes a necessity, and not a choice, statutory reform to 
include electronic service has become an imminent issue 
beckoning immediate attention.145  Allowing electronic service has 
begun to become more prevalent in other countries.146  For 
example, in a groundbreaking service-of-process case, an Australian 
defendant suffered a default judgment obtained through the 
exercise of service by publication via Facebook.147  However unique, 
the Australian case denotes positive signs that the judiciary 
worldwide is beginning to recognize and incorporate electronic 
methods of communication into the processes of civil procedure.148
Although the United States has not yet incorporated electronic 
service into service of process, there are signs that the trend is 
moving in that direction.
  
149  Recent changes to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure suggest that there is a general trend toward 
allowing electronic service.150  There have been parallel 
developments in the service of documents electronically in the 
federal and state judiciary system.151
 
 143. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
  In 1996, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were amended to make “clear the equality of filing 
 144. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017. 
 145. Conley, supra note 128, at 426 (“According to Bill Gates, Chairman of 
Microsoft, the internet is at the center of the action. ‘Microsoft, among others, is 
already programming to a future that can’t exist without the Web.’ . . . The move 
toward electronic communication is a serious one . . . .”). 
 146. Shultz, supra note 4, at 1498 (quoting Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve got Mail: 
The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337, 
381–82 (2003)). 
 147. Shultz, supra note 4, at 1497 (citing Nick Abrahams, Australian Court Serves 
Documents via Facebook, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 12, 2008.) 
 148. Shultz, supra note 4, at 1498. 
 149. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
 150. Murphy, supra note 127, at 94–95. 
 151. Id. at 92. 
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by electronic means with written filings.”152  Similarly, rules 5(a) 
and 5(b)(2)(E) work together to allow the electronic delivery of all 
pleadings and papers as long as the parties consent to it in 
writing.153  Furthermore, under the rules of discovery, parties are 
required to provide any electronically stored documents unless 
unduly burdensome.154  But perhaps the closest analogous change 
is in the use of electronic postings for class action lawsuits.  “Even 
absent judicial decree, parties to class actions are employing 
internet technologies, usually websites, to help meet notice 
requirements.”155
E. Shamrock Decision: Call for Statutory Change 
  These changes underscore the importance of 
electronic communication in modern litigation.  Because notice 
forms the foundation for litigation, electronic service ought to be 
allowed.  
The Mullane court articulates the tension between protecting 
notions of due process and the allowance of service by publication: 
“Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an 
advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a 
newspaper . . . .”156  While this may have been true in the past, the 
potential for service by publication to be a valid form of 
notification has increased with the advancement of modern 
technology.157  Electronic communication through social 
networking sites and internet postings offer a far more directed 
and intentional method for affording notice than an advertisement 
in a local newspaper.158
The constitutional standard articulated in Mullane does not 
bar publication as a means for affording notice.  It may even 
encourage its use when it is the means most reasonably calculated 
to reach the defendant.
  
159  The Court struck a balance between the 
competing tension of due process and judicial finality by 
articulating a variable standard where sufficiency of service is 
determined by reasonableness rather than a bright-line rule.160
 
 152. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e), § 28 (1995), amended by   FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(3). 
  
 153. Id. 5(a), 5(b)(2)(E). 
 154. Id. 26(a)(ii), 26(b)(2)(B). 
 155. Cantor, supra note 2, at 958. 
 156. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
 157. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 158. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 159. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
 160. Id. at 315 (“The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually 
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Yet, despite the Court’s clear articulation of the standard, the 
judicial system has been slow to adopt this formula when it comes 
to modern technology and service by publication.161  Increasingly 
complex business models and the transformation of 
communication modes have impacted nearly every aspect of civil 
procedure and modern litigation, but have yet to influence the 
standards for service by publication.162  Several commentators have 
addressed the need for the judicial system to more accurately 
reflect the present status of modern-day communication, in terms 
of best informing notice and the standards for service of process.163  
Fortunately, as aforementioned, a recent Australian case has 
confronted the use of service by publication through electronic 
means when it permitted a default judgment via a posting on 
Facebook.164  One commentator optimistically adds, “[n]ecessity, 
the mother of invention, has frequently been the catalyst for 
adapting the law to implement new technologies, and if a situation 
arises in which a message sent via Facebook is the only means to 
serve an elusive defendant abroad, the law might, in due time, 
adapt accordingly.”165  In a world where business and social 
networking is accomplished via the internet, and where service of 
process is the most fundamental aspect of the operation of law, it is 
logical to reduce constraints on service and permit a variety of 
electronic means.166  The fundamental purpose of due process is to 
afford the defendant adequate notice and the opportunity to be 
heard.167
Nevertheless, the Shamrock decision, although purporting to 
  Mullane articulated the policy rationale behind due 
process: the right to be heard and the corresponding need for 
flexibility.  Accordingly, it is only necessary to begin to allow the 
incorporation of electronic notification.   
 
informing the absentee and that one might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The 
reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be 
defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those 
affected . . . .”). 
 161. See discussion supra Part II. 
 162. See discussion supra Part IV.D. 
 163. See sources cited supra note 75. 
 164. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text. 
 165. Shultz, supra note 4, at 1528. 
 166. See Id. at 1527.  
 167. Cantor, supra note 2, at 945 (“The notice function of service protects the 
defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights not to be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law. A fundamental component of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
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maintain the status quo, effectively built an additional barrier to 
electronic publication as a permissible means for service of process.  
The hierarchical approach approved of in Shamrock requires the 
plaintiff to first exhaust all other alternatives before exercising 
service by publication.  Although the Court’s concerns regarding 
adequate due process are certainly justified, given the efficacy of 
modern-day technology, due process may be better served through 
a more liberal application of the rule.168  Because service of process 
is so fundamental to the administration of the law, it ought to be 
more amenable to change and adapt according to modern 
advancements in electronic communication.169
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Although Shamrock did not call for a modern adaptation for 
service by publication, the court’s hierarchical interpretation of the 
rule not only reiterated the status quo, but further restricted it.170  
This court reflects the majority sentiment that service by 
publication is an inadequate means for giving notice, but perhaps 
this is misguided.  As society trends toward public electronic means 
of communication, the means for affording adequate notice must 
necessarily change as well.  With the advent of web communication 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogging, electronically-mediated 
communication has quickly become the norm.171  Where service by 
publication was once an inferior means for providing notice, it may 
now be a viable, if not a constitutionally required method of 
service.172
 
   
 
 168. In fact, as one commentator suggests, “Electronic publication . . . could 
actually offer a greater likelihood of providing notice than the traditional method 
of service by publication.”  Woods, supra note 9, at 444. 
 169. Conley, supra note 127, at 417 (“The inevitable result of human progress 
is that courts are, and always will be, faced with the question of how to apply 
existing laws to new human behaviors to ensure that the judicial process continues 
reliably and preserves the parties’ legal rights. . . . [C]ertain processes are so 
fundamental to the operation of law that historically they have been more open to 
adaptability and change.”). 
 170. See discussion infra Part IV.A.  
 171. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 172. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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